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n 32 32 32 32 32
Audit　Cost（C） 0．5 1 0．5 1 0．5 1 0．5 1
Frequency　of　Audit　Purchase
Standard　Deviation 5，3013，7484，162 4，200 2，3821，72 3，3583，246
Average 14．913，37516．812，96918．50．937517．782，094
Frequency　of　Total　Audit　Purchase
Standard　Deviation 3，441 0，659 1，162 0．4212
Average 17．97 19．78 19．44 19．88
Frequency　of　ICS　Investment
Standard　Deviation3，796 5，885 4，131 5，195 6，647
Average 5，906 6，125 15．97 15．72 10．38
Frequency　of　Effort
Standard　Deviation4，697 3，513 3，538 3，251 2，768
Average 7，500 13．72 14．53 i6．41 18．22
Frequency　of　Asset　Purchase
Standard　Deviation4，454 4，052 2，581 2，723 2，612
Average 10．97 12．69 13．72 15．06 16．22
Coefficient
Effort　and　Asset　Purchase0．7439 0．5263 0．7553 0．8277 0．6759





















































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10　　11　　12　　13　　14　　15　　16　　17　　18　　19　　20
Period
十Auditing　Unavailable
■0■Auditing　Available（ICS　lnvestment　Public）
→←Auditing　Available（Penalties　lrnposed）
dO’Auditing　Available（ICS　Investment　Private）
・帽一Audi ingAvailable（Law　Suit）
Figure　7　Selection　of　Asset　Purchase　over　Time
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　　　Taking　a　look　at　the　selection　of　effort　and　the　asset　purchase　over　time（Figure　6　and
7），　the　frequency　of　mutual　defection　is　always　much　higher　when　auditing　is　unavailable．
The　audit　purchase　could　prevent　it　from　increasing　over　time．　Furthermore，　the　likeli－
hood　of　government　penalties　drives　the　asset　pur’chase　up　to　some　extent　towards　the　end．
4．Concluding　Remarks
The　summary　of　our　experimental　investigation　is　as　follows．
①So　long　as　the　investment　is　private，　managers　are　reluctant　to　invest　in　the　ICS，
　　　while　once　public，　they　are　very　eager　to　do　so．　However，　that　doesn’t　improve
　　　much　the　economic　efficiency，　which　results　don’t　support　necessarily　the　ICS
　　　lnvestment　as　a　slgnal　for　the　manager’s　honesty．　Moreover，　it　suddenly　dimin－
　　　ishes　in　the　market　where　government　penalties　are　likely　together　with　a　law　suit
　　　agalnst　managers．　The　experience　throughout　the　past　4　markets　might　raise
　　　doubts　in　the　minds　of　managers　about　the　effect　of　ICS　investment　on　the　inves－
　　　tors．
②The　possibi豆ity　of　law　suit　prevents　the　mutual　defection　of　manager　and　investor
　　　from　increasing　over　time，　as　our　previous　experimental　study（Kato　2006）shows．
　　　Furthermore，　the　threat　of　government　penalties　on　the　manager’s　dishone6ty
　　　proves　to　be　playing　an　efficient　role　in　inducing　trust　among　managers　and　inves－
　　　tors．
　　　It　i・imp・・tant　t・n．・t・th・t　th・g・v・mm・nt　direct　int・・v・nti・n・・uld　b・highly　．・ffi－
cient　even　without　the　transparency　of　ICS　investment。　It　would　be　a　right　answer　for　the
Japanese　government　to　rely　on　this　kind　of　intervention，　but　what　we　must　be　cautious
about　is　that　even　the　prohibitive　penalties　could　not　totally　eliminate　the　cheatings　which
attraCt　managerS．
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Appendix
1海デbrη3α∫εoπαηd！Instruction
General　Information
　　　You　have　been　given　the　opportunity　to　participate　in　a　study．　The　purpose　of　the
study　is　to　expand　the　knowledge　of　economic　decision　making．　You　have　the　opportunity
to　earn　the　money　in　an　experiment．
Information　about　the　experiment
　　　　You　will　now　participate　in　an　experiment．51aboratory　markets　are　created．　In　the
first　market（market①）auditing　is　unavailable，　while　available　in　others．　The　manager
can　invest　in　the　internal　control　system（ICS）throughout　5　markets，　although　the　invest－
ment　is　unobservable　to　an　investor　in　the　first　2　markets（market　O　and②）．　While　in　the
third　market（market③）both　the　ICS　lnvestment　and　the　audit　purchase　are　public，　in　the
last　2　markets（market④　and⑤）the　investor　can　sue　the　manager　for　his　loss．　In　the
market⑤penalties　are　likely　to　be　imposed　by　the　government　against　the．dishonest
behavior　of　managers．
　　　By　investing　in　the　ICS　at　the　cost　of　O．5　yen，　each　seller　makes　his　attempt　more　likely
to　be　fulfilled．　With　this　investment，　he　can　produce　a　high　quality　asset　with　probability
1／6，but　he　can　improve　this　probability　up　to　5／6　by　making　an　effort　at　the　cost　of　5　yen．
Without　this　investment，　on　the　other　hand，　he　can　produce　it　with　probability　1／5，　but　he
cap　improve　the　probability　only　up　to　4／5　through　his　effort．
　　　The　computer　always　discloses　that　the　asset　quality　is　high．　If　the　seller　wants　to　be
honest，　he　should　choose　an　effort．　When　auditing　is　available，　each　seller　can　purchase　an
audit．　If　he　purchases　it，　the　cost　and　the　audit　report　is　published　at　once，　stating　that　the
asset　quality　is　low　or　high．　The　audit　report　is　always　correct，　when　it　states　that　the　asset
quality　is　low，　but　sometimes　an　incorrect　audit　report　will　be　provided，　when　it　states　that
the　asset　quality　is　high．
　　　In　the　market　from　＠　to⑤，　each　seller　can　purchase　either　a　less　costly　audit　at　the
cost　of　O．5　yen　or　a　more　costly　audit　at　the　cost　of　l　yen．　If　he　doesn’t　invest　in　the　ICS　and
purchases　a　less　costly　audit，　an　incorrect　audit　report　will　be　provided　with　probability
1／3，while　if　he　doesn’t　invest　in　it　and　purchases　a　more　costly　audit，　the　likelihood　de－
creases　to　1／5．　On　the　other　hand，　the　ICS　investment　reduces　the　probability　of　incorrect
report　until　1／5　even　on　the　purchase　of　a　less　costly　audit．　The　purchase　of　a　more　costly
audit　decreases　it　to　as　small　as　l／IO．
　　　All　the　buyer　has　to　do　is　to　choose　a“buy”or“not　buy”in．the　market①②③The
computer　reveals　immediately　whether　he　gained　or　lost．　If　he　buys　a　low　quality　asset，　he
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Buy　　　＝10
Not　Buy＝0
［＝］
［コ
Transparency　of　Internal　Control　System
Effort　　＝　5
No　Effort＝0
［：＝コ．
［コ
　Form　for　Scores
ICS　Investment　＝0．5
No　ICS　Investment＝0
??????????????????
17
Audit
No　Audit＝0
［コ
［コ［コ［コ
＝0．50rl
Name
Seller’s
Payoffs
Total
will　lose　5　yen，　while　if　he　buys　a　high　quality　one，　he　will　gain　5　yen．　ln　the　markets④
and　＠　he　can　sue　the　seller　for　his　loss　at　the　cost　of　3　yen．　With　probability　1／2　he　can　win
and　his　loss　and　the　cost　of　law　suit　will　be　compensated．　With　probability　l／2　he　will　lose
and　put　up　with　himself　the　cost　of　law　suit．　However，　he　will　never　win，　if　the　seller　do－
esn’煤@purchase　an　audit　or　the　audit　report　says　that　the　asset　quality　is　low．
　　　In　the　market⑤the　loss　of　buyer　can　leads　to　penalties　imposed　on　the　seller　with
probability　1／2，　if　he　turns　out　to　be　making　no　effort．　Once　penalties　are　imposed，　he
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should　pay　fines，　namely　10　yen，　to　the　government：Penalties　imposed　on　the　seller　are
bound　to　continue　at　least　in　the　next　period．　He　should　pay　10　yen　as　fines　immediately
and　would　pay　another　10　yen　in　the　next　period，　whenever　the　buyer　loses，　regardless　of
whether　he　made　an　effort　or　not．　These　penalties　would　continue　with　a　half　chance　that
any　subsequent　period　is　last　and　with　certainty　as　long　as　the　seller　doesn’t　purchase　an
audit．　The　disappearance　of　these　effects　is　announced　to　the　both　sides．　The　result　of　law
suit　doesn’t　depend　on　the　fact　of　penalties　imposed．　The　buyer　would　still　lose　with　prob－
ability　1／2，
　　　Each　seller　should　fill　a　form　for　scores　in　order　to　assure　how　much　he　has　gained　or
lost　in　each　round，　since　his　payoff　is　not　revealed　qn　the　computer　terminaL　When　he
makes　an　effort，　he　should　write　down　the　cost（5　yen）in　the　second　column．　When　he
purchases　an　audit，　he　should　also　write　down　the　cost（0．5　yen　or　l　yen）in　the　third
column．
　　　Depending　on　whether　each　buyer　has　botlght　the　asset　or　not，　his　payoff　revealed　on
the　computer　terminal　differs　from－50r十5to　O．　In　the　former　he　should　write　down　lO
in　the　first　column；the　price　that　each　buyer　has　paid　for，　while　in　the　latter　he　should
write　down　O．　In　the　market④and⑤if　the　buyer　wins　the　law　suit，　he　should　write　down
－80utside　the　fifth　column．　ln　the　market　＠　the　seller　should　write－10　as　well，　when－
ever　fines　are　imposed．　His　total　payoff　in　each　session　will　be　automatically　calculated
and　shown　on　the　computer　terminal　after　the　last　round　is　finished．　He　should　confirm　it．
Each　session　includes　20　rounds．
　　　Finally　your　initial　pay　is　fixed　on　how　many　sessions　you　have　played，　regardless　of
your　role；namely　200　yen　a　session．　Your　pay　will　increase　or　decrease　depending　on　your
performance，　The　money　you　have　actually　gained　or　lost　is　the　payoff　revealed　on　the
computer　terminal　or　written　down　on　the　form　multiplied　by　two．　For　example，　a　loss　of
5yen　revealed　on　the　computer　terminal　suggests　that　you　have　actually　lost　10　yen．
